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attached fixtures were completely destroyed by a tenant, and Appellant sought to be 
reimbursed for the losses under a Policy of insurance issued by Respondent to Appellant. 
Respondent denied Appellant's claim, citing exclusions under the Policy. The District Court 
granted summary judgment in favor of Respondent, holding that an exclusion applied and that 
there was therefore no coverage for the losses. 
The District Court erred in its interpretation of the language of the Policy. In fact, based 
upon the plain meaning of the exclusions, and the case law from other jurisdictions interpreting 
such language, it is clear that the exclusions cited by Respondent in its denial of coverage do not 
apply to the facts of this case, and that Appellant should be reimbursed for her covered losses 
under the Policy. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. Whether There Is A Covered Loss Is Not An Issue On Appeal 
Respondent first notes that the issue of whether the insurance policy provided coverage is 
not in dispute, and argues that Appellant's first issue on appeal should not address that issue. 
The parties are in agreement on this issue. Appellant's initial brief on appeal also noted that the 
District Court found "that Respondent had not offered any opposition to the argument that the 
loss of her residence was a direct loss covered by the Policy, and thus granted summary judgment 
at 
7 is not at at 3. 
Appellant's Brief correctly noted that the issue of whether the loss was covered was not an issue 
on appeal. 
However, the issue of whether there was insurance coverage for the loss is an issue on 
appeal due to the question of whether the exclusions apply. While there is no question the loss is 
a "covered loss," the Policy does not provide coverage if one of the exclusions applies. That is 
why the first issue on appeal was whether the District Court erred in holding that there was not 
coverage, because of the application of the exclusions, not because the loss was not a covered 
loss. The Policy does not provide coverage if one of the exclusions applies, that is why the first 
issue on appeal was stated the way it was. 
However, the question of how the issue on appeal was worded is not material, as both 
parties agree that there is no dispute that the loss in this case was a covered loss, and that the 
District Court held that an exclusion applied and thus dismissed Appellant's claim for coverage. 
Thus, the main issue on appeal is whether the District Court incorrectly held that an exclusion 
applied and incorrect! y dismissed Appellant's claim for coverage under the policy. 
B. The District Court Erred in Holding that the Exclusion For 
Faulty, Inadeguate and/or Defective Work Applied in This 
Case 
Given the burden imposed upon the insurance company to prove that the exclusion 
2 
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it did not prevent claims such as the Appellant's, the District Court erred in granting summary 
judgment in favor of Respondent. Rather, based upon the undisputed facts of record regarding 
the unauthorized demolition of the property and based upon the language of the exclusion, the 
District Court should have found that the exclusion did not apply and should have granted 
summary judgment in favor of Appellant, not Respondent. 
In its response, Respondent argues that the exclusion applies based upon its plain 
language, and alternatively, that even if the exclusion were read to require consent of the 
Appellant for the construction, the Appellant did consent to the demolition in this case. These 
conclusions are not supported by the case law or the undisputed facts of record. 
1. The Plain 1\'Ieaning of the Exclusion Requires the Work Be 
Performed With the Authorization of the Insured 
The District Court incorrectly held that the exclusion for faulty, inadequate or defective 
work applied. The exclusion provides in part: 
c. Faulty, inadequate or defective; 
(2) design, specifications, workmanship, repair, 
construction, renovation, remodeling, 
grading, compaction; 
of part or all of any property whether on or off the Described Location. 
3 
at 8 It acts 
it to 
so, were faulty, inadequate or defective workmanship, repair, construction, renovation or 
remodeling. 
First, Respondent argues that it is undisputed that Reynoso was to make "certain 
improvements" to the dwelling and that those improvements were not completed and therefore 
were inadequate, defective or faulty. This argument ignores the undisputed evidence regarding 
what "improvements" were in fact authorized. The evidence shows that Reynoso was 
authorized to make some cosmetic improvements if he so chose while residing in the Property. 
However, the purpose of the Real Estate Purchase Agreement was to sell the Property and to 
Lease it to Reynoso prior to a sale. The purpose of the contract was not for Plaintiff to hire 
Reynoso to perform repair or remodel services. Authorizing a tenant to make cosmetic 
improvements to a property while living in it is very different from hiring someone to make 
repairs or improvements to the Property. Making the cosmetic improvements was not required 
under the contract between Plaintiff and Reynoso, nor was Reynoso to be compensated for any 
improvements he made. He was merely authorized under the contract to make cosmetic 
improvements if he chose to for his own benefit. The Purchase and Sale Agreement's provision 
regarding improvements Mr. Reynoso intended to make to the property provided only that: 
Buyer intends to make certain improvements to the property upon 
possession, with the intent to sell the property for a profit ... the 
4 
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at 1, 9 at 
The Purchase and Sale Agreement does not define the term "certain improvements" and 
only evidence in the record of what "improvements" to the property were contempiated by 
the parties is the Affidavit of Shammie Fisher, which states that the "improvements" included 
such things as new flooring or upgrades to the kitchen and bathroom floors and counters, new 
light and painting. Fisher Aff., at <J[ 9 (R. at 85). There was no discussion or agreement for the 
Buyer to demolish or rebuild any portion of the premises or remodel the structure. Id. This is 
consistent with the fact that the Buyer indicated that he intended to use the property as his 
primary residence during the term of the lease/purchase. See id.; Purchase and Sale Agreement, 
at 4, <J[ 19 (R. at 91). 
Moreover, the claim for damages in this case is not based upon the "improvements" that 
Reynoso was allowed to do as part of the lease agreement. This is not a case where Reynoso tore 
out counter tops and failed to replace them, or did a bad job installing tile on the floor in the 
bathroom or got paint on the carpet when he was painting. Those might be situations where the 
exclusion may apply because the damage would have been caused by the acts of Reynoso in 
making improvements that he was authorized to do. 
However, the damage in this case was not caused by Reynoso performing the cosmetic 
improvements he was authorized to do in an inadequate or faulty manner. Rather, the damages 
5 
to not stem 
"work" performed by Reynoso as allowed under the contract, it stemmed from unauthorized and 
unknown actions of Reynoso. Such destruction is not included in the exclusion. 
Rather, the exclusion contemplates the situation where a person contracts with another to 
do construction or remodel work, and then does a poor job or fails to finish. For example, if 
Appellant had agreed to allow Reynoso to remodel the entire structure, and he had abandoned the 
project before completion, that might be the type of loss included in the exclusion. However, 
there is no evidence that there was any agreement for Reynoso to perform any remodeling or 
work that would require the destruction of the premesis; rather, the work was to be cosmetic 
improvements only. This is exactly what the Court in Husband v. LaFayette Ins., Co., was 
addressing when it held that in order for the exclusion for faulty or inadequate renovation or 
remodel to apply, the alterations must be undertaken by the insured or someone authorized by 
the insured and the insured must be dissatisfied with the quality of the performance under that 
contract. 635 So.2d 309,311 (La.App. 1994) (emphasis added). As that Court held, alterations 
"undertaken without authorization and in direct conflict with the terms of the lease . . . fall 
outside the exclusion of the policy." Id. In this case, there is no dispute that the alterations to the 
property, including its total destruction, conflicted with the terms of the Agreement permitting 
only "certain improvements," which Appellant has testified were cosmetic in nature, and were 
6 
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argues that the demolition of the residence falls within those definitions. Respondent's 
analysis in this regard fails to take into account the meaning of the words when taken altogether, 
and what the meaning of the exclusion is when read as a whole. Stating that there is no coverage 
for faulty or inadequate "design, specifications, workmanship, repair, construction, renovation, 
[or] remodeling" implies that there is some affirmative act on the part of the insured to 
commence a project. Either the insured itself commences a project or the insured hires someone 
else to do a project. There is no "design" or "workmanship" or "repair" if an unauthorized third 
party comes onto property and performs demolition. 
Another argument relied upon by the District Court and advanced by Respondent is that 
because another exclusion contains language to the effect that an intentional loss is covered only 
if it is done by or at the direction of the insured, the fact that such language is not included in the 
faulty work exclusion means the work need not be done by the insured or with its authorization. 
However, the fact that another exclusion contains the language "by or at the direction of the 
insured" does not change the analysis set forth above because, with respect to the faulty 
workmanship exclusion, there is no circumstance where a remodel or construction project can be 
done on the property of the insured without their consent or direction. If it is done without the 
consent of the insured, it is not, by its definition, remodel or repair. Thus, there is no reason to 
7 
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However, with respect to the exclusion for intentional loss, an insured could have loss 
from an intentional act that was at its direction, or it couid have ioss from an intentionai act done 
without its knowledge or consent. That is why the exclusion for intentional loss must contain 
language that the loss must be "by or at the direction of the insured" for that exclusion to apply; 
because there are two types of loss from intentional acts, and the Policy is only covering one of 
them. 
Conversely, there is only one type of design, workmanship, repair or remodel of a 
property, and that is where an insured or someone authorized by the insured undertakes such 
work. There is no such thing as a design, remodel or repair to the property of an insured that the 
insured is not either involved in or authorizing. Such destruction or work would not be repair or 
remodel, it would be wrongful and unauthorized and would not be covered by the exclusion. For 
example, if someone painted graffiti on a wall, that would not be considered remodel or repair of 
a property, whereas a contractor hired by an insured painting the exterior of a building would be. 
The difference is that one is authorized by the insured and the other is a wrongful act of 
destruction not authorized by the insured. 
In sum, the language of the exclusion, when read as a whole, contemplates action taken 
by an insured to improve its property through either remodel or repair work performed by it or by 
8 
or 
2. The Undisputed Facts Demonstrate that the Damage to the 
Property \Vas Not Authorized 
Respondent points to the lease/purchase agreement, and argues that Agreement is 
authorization for Reynoso to destroy the residence and its contents. It is not. As noted above, 
the only evidence in the record of what "improvements" to the property were contemplated by 
the parties is the Affidavit of Shammie Fisher, which states that the "improvements" included 
such things as new flooring or upgrades to the kitchen and bathroom floors and counters, new 
light and painting. Fisher Aff., at !ff 9 (R. at 85). There was no discussion or agreement for the 
Buyer to demolish or rebuild any portion of the premises or remodel the structure. Id. 
Authorizing a person to paint a wall is not the same as authorizing them to tear it down anymore 
than consent to have a filling is authorization for a dentist to pull all of a patient's teeth. There is 
no dispute in this case that the destruction of the property was not authorized by Appellant prior 
to its occurring. 
Respondent next argues that Appellant consented to having the structure rebuilt, and that 
such acquiescence in the reconstruction means that the exclusion applies; essentially, Respondent 
argues that once the residence was destroyed, Appellant agreed to have Reynoso rebuild it, and 
the covered loss is his inadequate rebuilding of the property. First, this misstates the covered 
loss. The covered loss was the destruction of the residence, not the failure to rebuild it. 
9 
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repair work done. This is like the situation where a person comes up to a car at a city stop light 
and sprays something on the windshield of a car and then charges the person to have it cleaned 
off. It cannot be said that the driver "consented" to having their window cleaned. The only 
reason the window \Vas dirty was due to the unauthorized act of the person spraying the window. 
Similarly, in this case, it cannot be seen as consent for Appellant to allow Reynoso to attempt to 
fix the residence after he destroyed it. Consent means "voluntary agreement." Black's Law 
Disctionary, 61h Ed. In this case, Appellant did not enter into a "voluntary agreement" to allow 
Reynoso to perform remodel and construction work on the residence because she was in a forced 
position brought about by Reynoso's unlawful and wrongful act. Her acquiescence in the attempt 
to rebuild, as set forth in the texts quoted by Respondent in its brief, was not voluntary and 
cannot be seen as a voluntary agreement or consent for Reynoso to remodel her residence. 
Respondent also argues that the work done by Reynoso was done by or at her direction 
because Reynoso was required to give monthly updates for plans and upgrade, and because the 
contract between the parties required any subcontractors to sign lien waivers. (R. at 95-96). 
These facts are not material because they come from language in the Purchase and Sale 
Agreement addressing the "improvements" to be made under that Agreement. As noted above, 
the Property Sale Agreement does not define "improvements" and the only evidence of the 
10 
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such things as new flooring or upgrades to the kitchen and bathroom floors and counters, new 
light and painting. Fisher Aff., at <J[ 9 (R. at 85). Again, the undisputed evidence is that there was 
no discussion or agreement for the Buyer to demolish or rebuild any portion of the premises or 
remodel the structure. Id. Thus, the language in the Property Sale Agreement requiring 
subcontractors to sign lien waivers relates to any painters or other tradesmen who may have 
performed the cosmetic upgrades contemplated by the parties and the updates would include 
things like pictures of new light fixtures to be installed or information on whether other cosmetic 
improvements were being made. That language has nothing to do with the destruction of the 
premises or any attempts to fix damage caused by Reynoso and does not demonstrate that 
Appellant was directing the work to be done to fix damage Reynoso caused. It relates only to 
the cosmetic improvements authorized under the Property Sale Agreement. There is no dispute 
that Appellant did not voluntarily participate in the work to be done to fix the destruction caused 
by Reynoso. 
Appellant likewise did not have knowledge of the destruction of the residence until after 
it had happened. The undisputed evidence of record is that Appellant did not have knowledge 
that Reynoso would destroy the residence. Respondent wants to argue that the fact that she knew 
that "improvements" were to be made is enough, and it doesn't matter that she didn't know that 
11 
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extent is not was to lS 
make some sense if Appellant had agreed beforehand to allow Reynoso to do major remodel 
work. In that case, it might be foreseeable that he would have to demolish the residence in order 
to do that work. However, the fact that the work contemplated by Appellant and Reynoso was 
cosmetic in nature and was not structural, and the fact that Reynoso represented that he would be 
using the house as his primary residence, demonstrate that it was not foreseeable that Reynoso 
would level the home, and that Appellant's knowledge of the fact that cosmetic improvements 
would be made while he lived in the home cannot be seen as knowledge that he would tear the 
home down. 
3. The Case Law Cited By Appellant Supports the Conclusion That the 
Exclusion Does Not Apply 
Because the Idaho appellate courts have not had the occasion to interpret a policy 
provision like the one at issue in this case, Appellant directed the Court to other decisions 
wherein courts have interpreted exclusions in policies with the same language, and have found 
the exclusion for faulty or inadequate work to apply only to situations where the work was 
performed by the insured or someone authorized by the insured. As noted above, the conclusion 
of these courts makes sense because it is understood that actions involving construction, 
renovation, remodeling, grading, compaction and maintenance are not performed by persons 
other than an owner of real property or by someone hired by them to do such work. It is not 
12 
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insured or with the insured' s consent. It is implied in the meaning of renovation and repair work. 
Respondent attempts to distinguish the cases cited by Appellant, beginning with 
Husband v. LaFayette Ins., Co., 635 So.2d 309, 311 (La.App. 1994 ). First, Respondent argues 
that Husband is factually distinguishable because in Husband the alterations were taken without 
the authorization of the insured and in direct conflict with the terms of the lease, whereas in this 
case, Respondent argues that Appellant authorized the destruction of her property. As discussed 
at length above, Appellant did not authorize either the destruction of her property nor did she 
voluntarily agree to the plans to rebuild it. Morever, just like the situation in Husband, 
Reynoso' s actions in destroying the residence were in fact in direct violation of the terms of the 
Property Sale Agreement between the parties, which contemplated that Reynoso would live in 
the residence while making cosmetic repairs. Thus, Husband is similar factually, and its rational 
is persuasive and compelling: 
This court interprets the exclusion contained in the pertinent 
policy provisions to apply to situations where the insured or 
someone authorized by the insured contracts for alterations to 
the propertv and is dissatisfied with the quality of the 
performance under that contract. The insurer by this exclusion 
intended to prevent the expansion of coverage under the policy to 
insuring the quality of a contractual undertaking by the insured of 
someone authorized by him. 
However, in this case the alterations were undertaken without 
authorization and in direct conflict with the terms of the lease, 
13 
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Contrary to the assertions of Respondent, the court in Husband is not reading additional 
ianguage into the policy. Rather, the court is recognizing that when repairs or alterations are 
done on a property, they are done by or at the direction of the insured. That does not require 
additional language. Instead, it interprets the words when read as a whole to mean that repair and 
remodel work implies an agreement or authorization to do the work. 
Likewise, Respondent's attempts to distinguish Home Savings of Am. v. Cont'! Ins. Co., 
104 Cal.Rptr. 2d 790 (Ct.App. 2001) are unpersuasive. Respondent argues that in Home 
Savings, the residence was leveled and for redevelopment and there was not intent to rebuild, 
whereas in this case, the residence was not destroyed, it was merely demolished and then 
partially rebuilt. However, the fact that the residence in Home Savings was demolished for 
redevelopment was not central to the holding that the exclusion did not apply. See 104 Cal.Rptr. 
2d at 852-53. Thus, that factual distinction is immaterial. Additionally, the insurance company in 
Home Savings argued that the property was destroyed as part of an overall process of renovation, 
and that the destruction of the property was just one step in the process of remodeling. Id. at 852. 
This is the same argument advanced by Respondent in this case: that the destruction of the 
residence was just one step in its renovation. Thus, the differences raised by Respondent do not 
make the outcome of the case distinguishable, and Home Savings is still persuasive authority 
14 
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forth in those cases, which support a finding that the exclusion does not apply in this case. See 
eg., Fidelity Coop. Bank v. Nova Cas. Co., 726 F.3d 31, 38 (i Cir. 2013). 
Respondent also argues that a fe\v cases have held that the exclusion applies regardless of 
the insured' s authorization of the work, and directs the Court to Wilson v. Farmers Ins. Exchage 
in support of its claim that the exclusion applies. 102 Cal.App.4th 1171, 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 305 
(2002). First, Wilson does not stand for the proposition that the exclusion applies regardless of 
the insured's authorization of the work. In fact, the court in Wilson cited the language in 
Husband v. Lafayette Ins. Co., that the exclusion for faulty construction or remodeling applied 
"to situations where the insured of someone authorized by the insured contracts for alteration to 
the property and is dissatisfied with the quality of the performance under that contract." 635 
So.2d 309, 311 (La.Ct.App. 1994 ). Thus, the Wilson court agreed with the general statement of 
law in Husband. 
However, it then held that, under the facts in Wilson, the exclusion applied because the 
insured had knowledge of and authorized the renovation. In fact, the insured in Wilson watched 
as the property was partially torn down and did not stop the destruction because he had agreed to 
the remodel. The facts in Wilson are distinguishable in that one crucial aspect: the insured in 
Wilson knew of the destruction of the property. In fact, he watched the destruction of the 
15 
1 Wilson saw that Bruce s son, 
was remodeling the house, including replacing some exterior walls 
and part of the foundation and putting in new plumbing. Around 
March 1997, Wilson saw most of the exterior walls of the house 
had been stripped down to the studs. 
Id. at 1173, 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 306. In Wilson, the insured watched over a period of a month as the 
property was partially torn down, and he did not stop it because he had agreed to the remodel. 
This is not the situation in this case. In this case, Appellant did not sit idly by and watch 
as her property was torn down to the foundation. She did not drive by, as the insured in Wilson 
did, over the course of a month and watch as her property was torn down. In fact, the 
undisputed facts demonstrate that Appellant was not aware that Reynoso was going to attempt to 
tear down and remodel the house and that she was not aware of his intent to destroy the structure 
until after she was notified of its complete destruction. Fisher Aff., at 15 (R. at 84). Appellant 
did not have an opportunity to stop the destruction of her property and prior to its destruction she 
did not have any agreement with Reynoso to have the structure itself remodeled and he was not 
authorized to destroy it. Id. at <JI 6. Appellant was not a willing participant in the destruction of 
her residence in this case, as the insured in Wilson was, she was a victim. Thus, the holding in 
Wilson is distinguishable and the general statements of law in Wilson actually support the 
Appellant's claims in this case. 
In reaching its decision that the faulty workmanship, construction or renovation exclusion 
16 
one 
that did not address the issue in this case, and one from a federal district court in California, 
which deait with facts entirely different from those in this case. Respondent cites both of those 
cases and argues that they support the application of the exclusion. 
However, in Capelouto v. Valley Forge Ins. Co., 900 P.2d 414 (Wash. App. 1999), the 
issue of whether the work performed was authorized by or contracted for by the plaintiff was not 
even addressed. The plaintiff in Capelouto did not argue that he had not contracted for or 
authorized the work done on the sewer line in opposition to the application of the exclusion. At 
no point did the court address the issues before the Court in this case, nor did the court address 
the decisions and analysis cited in this case. Similarly, Stephens v. Liberty Mut, 2008 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 12243, 2008 WL 480287 (N.Dist. Cal. 2008), also is not persuasive because that case 
does not contain any analysis of the issue of whether the faulty, inadequate or defective 
construction applies to situations where an unauthorized third party destroys real property and 
involves facts distinguishable from this case. 
Based upon the undisputed facts of record, and based upon the case law cited by 
Appellant, the decision of the District Court that the exclusion for faulty or inadequate work 
applies should be reversed and summary judgment should be granted in favor of Appellant on 
that issue. 
17 
The Court Should Hear the Issue of \Vhether The District 
Court Erred In Denying Appellant Summary Judgment On the 
Intentional Loss Exclusion And Decide It In Favor of 
Appellant 
The other exclusion raised by Respondent as a basis for denying coverage for the 
dwelling and fixtures is the exclusion for intentional loss, which provides: 
We do not insure for loss caused directly or indirectly by any of the 
following. 
h. Intentional Loss, meaning any loss arising out of any act 
committed: 
( 1) by or at the direction of you or any person or organization 
named as an additional insured; and 
(2) with the intent to cause a loss. 
Policy, at 7-8 (R. at 26-27). As to the intentional loss exclusion, the District Court erred in 
denying Appellant's motion for summary judgment because the material facts regarding 
Appellant's directing or authorizing the acts which caused the loss were not in dispute. 
Specifically, the District Court erred in holding that "whether Reynoso' s activities were 
authorized by Fisher presents genuine issues of material fact which preclude summary judgment 
on the issue of whether the intentional loss exclusion applies." Decision, at 9 (R. at 231 ). 
Respondent argues that this issue is not properly considered on appeal because an order 
denying a motion for summary judgment is an interlocutory order from which no direct appeal 
may be taken, and that this rule is not altered by the entry of an appealable final judgment. 
Dominguez, ex. rel. Hamp v. Evergreen RES, Inc., 142 Idaho 7, 13, 121 P.3d 938, 944 (2005). 
18 
case, 
disposing of the entire case. Thus, Appellant is permitted to pursue a direct appeal because the 
order appealed did in fact dispose of the entire case. The direct appeal may be taken from the 
final order granting Respondent's motion for summary judgment, and because a direct appeal is 
permitted on that basis, Appellant should be permitted to raise other issues on appeal. 
The cases holding that a denial of summary judgment may not be reviewed on appeal 
even after a final judgment address the issue of whether, after a trial on the merits, the Court 
should revisit the issue of whether summary judgment was improperly denied. See Watson v. 
Idaho Falls Consol. Hasps., 111 Idaho 44, 45, 720 P.2d 632 (1986) (appeal after jury trial); 
Evans v. Jensen, 103 Idaho 937, 942 (Ct. App. l 982)(explaining the reason for the rule: "The 
final judgment in a case can be tested upon the record made at trial, not the record made at the 
time summary judgment was denied."). Clearly, after a trial on the merits, it does not make sense 
for the Court to review the decision denying a motion for summary judgment. 
However, in this case, that policy reason does not apply. There was no trial on the merits 
and thus an appeal of the order denying summary judgment is not seeking to second guess any 
decision by the trier of fact. In fact, in asking this Court to reverse the District Court and grant 
Appellant's motion for summary judgment on the issue of the intentional loss exclusion, 
Appellant is seeking to conserve judicial resources and prevent the need for a trial upon remand. 
19 
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to case, the 
Brief on Appeal, the District Court decision denying summary judgment in favor of Appellant 
should be reversed. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The District Court's holding and the Respondent's arguments that the loss in this case 
was caused directly by faulty inadequate or defective work as set forth in the exclusion is simply 
not reasonable or supported by the case law interpreting insurance contracts. Respondent simply 
cannot meet its burden in this case to clearly demonstrate the application of the exclusions. The 
exclusion for faulty or inadequate work does not apply, and summary judgment should have been 
granted to Appellant by the District Court on that issue. Likewise, the exclusion for intentional 
loss does not apply and summary judgment should have been granted in Appellant's favor on that 
issue. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Appellant respectfully requests the judgment of the District 
Court be reversed, and that judgment be entered in favor of the Appellant on the issue of 
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